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Financial Issues in the North, in the South, and in Between
Garlos F. Diaz Alejandro*
Yale University

I. Introduction
Fran the Wild West of the United States and unregulated Hong Kong,

to prudent Bogota and born-again Santiago de Chile, during the early
1980s banks and other financial 1ntennediaries have been experiencing
discomfort and even failure.

Coot>anies and countries, big and small,

announce al.roost daily incapacity to meet punctually their f1nancial
obligations.

From financial repression and too little internediation

1n the 1950s and 1960s, both national and international markets appear

to have swung to bubbly excess, or so the financial press tells us.
Mocking bankers and teasing borrowers, as during the early 1930s, have
become popular sports across the ideological spectrum.

'Dus essay

will probe explanations for this state of affairs, focusing on issues
of interest to less developed countries (LDCs), particularly semi
industrialized Latin Anerican nations, but will also highlight therres
co:rmnn to the analysis of any financial market.

Much discussion on

· LDC external debt and LDC financial liberalization has neglected those
therres, often with seriously misleading consequences.
The major topics to be discussed are: (a) international, private
financial markets and their alleged inperfections, and how they favored
or penalized different types of LOCs during the 1970s; (b) international
exchange rate and liquidity arrangements and how they llll)inged on LDCs.
Experirrents in exchange rate policy carried out by Southern Cone
countries in Latin Anerica, and their interaction with international
capital markets, will also be discussed; (c) the role of international
financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank.

-2Many

related topics, such as concessional finance, direct foreign

investnent, export credits, and the future of SDRs, will receive little
. or no attention. The roost shocking anission is lack of discussion of
the financial (and real) plight of the poorest LOCs, particularly acute
during the early 1980s and without likely remedies for the rest of
the decade.

Renections on easier problems will close the paper.

-3II. International (private) financial markets
The

stylized facts regarding the 1970s upsurge of private lending

to sC>IJE I.Des (primarily the Newly Industrializing Countries, NICs) are
fairly well known, so they will not be discussed here.

For a discussion

of those facts see Ba.cha and Diaz Alejandro, 1982.
'!be focus will be on the following questions: ·
-What is wrong, if anything, with present ~ n t s of
private financial markets? Are bankers, as often alleged in the financial
press, short-sighted lelllTlings (or burros), or are they maximizing agents
as clever as the average business person, taking advantage of naws in
market mechanisms? Both microeconomic and macroeconanic considerations
will be included in the discussion.
-If those flaws exist, who gains and loses from them at inter
national and national levels,particularly anx>ng (and within) LOCs?
Inperfect markets and clever agents.

A central argument is

that financial markets are quite different from spot camxxiity markets.
The spot market for horoc>geneous apples can be m:x:lelled as one Where
price sunmarizes all relevant 1nfonnat1on for atomistic buyers and sellers.
Such textbook idealizations capture the essence of certain types of
real-world competitive spot markets.

Any

1ndividual can buy or sell

all the horrogeneous apples she wants at the going market price.
Everyone is a small price taker.
There are no small lenders or borrowers in the sense that no
one can borrow all she wants at going market rates, even when rrost
borrowers will not affect by their transactions standard market rates.
No one will lend simply on the basis of the highest "price" offered
for the loan.

Once apple quality is established and sound cash is

produced on the spot, apple buyers and sellers will care only about

-4Every loan, however, will necessarily involve other considerations

price.

besides a price which 1nclooes risk-premia:

the size of the loan will

be a matter of discussion (i.e. 1 there will be s~ rationing) and

other conditions may be attached. Wh_y? lenders can never be quite
sure whether borrowers intend to repay, and ·there is no COJJ;)letely
credible

way

intentions.
metries.

borrowers can use to persuade lenders of their honorable
There is no sinple way around these 1nfonnational asym

Such s1.nple, COIIJIX)nsensical fact is a start toward under

standing why lending nations want gunboats, the Mafia

~

break thumbs,

and bankruptcy laws exist.
A lender conteIJl)lating an intemational loan will have well
known concerns regarding the soundness of the project and the willing

ness and ability of borrowers to translate project earnings into
foreign exchange.

But without grossly departing from usual rules-of

the-game nor taking leave of her senses, she may also think:
1. The project may not be particularly good, but the borrower

is likely to have lots of foreign exchange from other national sources.
'fue green light for the loan is mre likely if there are many other

lucrative links between the bank and the borrowing country.
2. Neither the project nor the prospects for the borrowing
country look good but:
-somebody is going to bail the country out 1n the future,
because it is too strategic, or because its failure to service debt
would mean an 1ntemat1onal panic.
-even if the country is not bailed out,

!!1Y_

bank cannot be

allowed to fail, and ex-post it will be hard to show that the lending

.was not wise.

-5-even if 11\Y bank fails,
difficult to establish.

~

responsibility in the event will be

A loan officer will never go far by letting

other banks take a larger share of the business:

risks tmJ.St be taken,

especially when blame for failure may never reach me!

The nnney,

after all, is not mine (contrast with direct foreign investors), and
(some) of the depositors are insured by the governnent, anywas.
One may note that some of the lenders are either nationalized
(e.g., French banks) or are said to be closely attuned to signals
emanating from their governments and their exporting or foreign policy
concerns (e.g., Gennan and Japanese banks).

It has been argued that

the failure of nnst LDCs to sell bonds or noating rate notes to
individual investors shows how ruch m:>re sensitive those individuals
are about

IDC

risk than the banks which manage their deposits.

Public

utterances of those bankers will tend to project an opt:1misrn which
may or may not be warranted.

Most of these considerations apply to national as well as
international lending, lending to sovereign borrowers or to large
corrpanies.

This is

why

Central Banlcs have "prudential" regulations

covering corrrrercial banks and other financial intermediaries, particularly
when deposits in those~!fu1ttitutions are insured.

Few laissez-faire

enthusiasts would go as far as eliminating all prudential regulations
over national financial systems (although in some Latin American
countries ill-conceived experiments in financial liberalization came
very close to that, with lamentable consequences).

In general, regulations

over domestic lending seem greater than those over international lending
occUITing from off-shore centers, e.g., the Eurocurrency market.

-6While concerns as to whether a borrower really intends to repay
the loan lead to rationing of credit and presl.lllably t o ~ lending
than under Ml-:1nfonnation circumstances, the other thoughts a loan
officer may have may lead to

~

lending that is socially desirable.

"Socially desirable" loans are defined here as those financing activities
yielding a rate of return higher than a hypothetical interest rate
generated by f\mdamental thrift and productivity data for the world
econorey, both adjusted for risks which could not be avoided even by
the wisest cosnopolitan planner.

See

Ohlin 1976 for an early discussion

of rooral hazard and expectations of public subsidies in international
lending.

As

a result of these market 111'.perfections, some induced by

governnents, others intrinsic in capital markets with incont>lete
:1nfonnation, sane borrowers

may

be shut out, while others are showered

with loans, depending on specific characteristics of lenders and
borrowers, as well as the stage of the business cycle.
On

the borrowing side, public agents signing up the loan, not

always high minded and patriotic, often do not face much of a liability
if things go wrong.

Pr1vate agents on the borrowing side will typically

have their loan repaynent guaranteed by the public sector.
cases (which will be discussed below), exchange rate policy
private agents to borrow abroad,

insuring

risks either explicitly or implicitly.

In some
may

:induce

them against devaluation

'Ille incentive structure for

both public and private agents often contains strong inducements to
borrow abroad roore than is socially desirable, in the sense defined
previously.

To check these tendencies, and to avoid turning the tenns

of borrowing unduly onerous,

many

countries will attefll)t to exercise

central control over external borrowing.

-7Even before the Great Fear of August-September 1982, there was
considerable discussion 1n the United States about the optimal regulation
of banks and other financial intennediaries.

The dangers of canbining

generous explicit or implicit deposit insurance with the lifting of
supervision over portfolios has been generally recognized.

A strong

case can be made that the deregulation of financial intermediaries
1n any country must be accoopanied by the substantial reduction 1n

deposit insurance and the requirement that those intermediaries provide
the public with infonna.tion about their portfolios.

Under those

circumstances it is conceivable that depositors could pick and choose
aroong banks according to their preferences 1n their risk-return trade
off; a weakened deposit insurance would not allow depositors to think
that "one bank is as good as another." Whether a nnre transparent
and less regulated banking system would be a reliable supplier of the
public good, roney, remains a m:x>t point.

This discussion involves

macroeconomic considerations, to which we now turn.
Macroeconomic considerations and some history.

The

consequences

of infonna.tional and roral-hazard imperfections listed above will be
found 1n an Indian village as well as in Bogota or New York, in national
or international credit markets.

They go on all the tinE, 1n spite

of supervision by Central Ba.rue authorities, w1 thout unduly exacerbating
the pains of the human condition.
But financial markets have also been found both to aggravate
and

initiate ma.croeconanic instability.

Kindleberger (1978, especially

chapters land 2) has provided a masterful description of a typical
financial crisis, as insightful for 1982 as for earlier years.

As a

consequence of shocks of sundry nature "the temptation bec~s virtually
irresistible to take the roney and run." Such behavior by individual

-8lenders, of course, aggravates the crisis, which can only be stopped
by someone acting as lender of last resort.

At this aggregate level there

are conplementary informational and practical game-theoretic considerations
Central Banking IIDre of an art than a science:

making

"the lender of

last resort should exist, but his presence should be doubted." One may
note that not only is econanic history Ml of exarrples of financial
manias, panics and crashes, but there is also a growing industry of
JIDdel-building showing that markets composed of perfectly rational agents
can generate bubbles with drama.tic bursts.

'!hose markets could be for

foreign exchange or for other financial assets (including future claim.c;
on apples).

See IX>mbusch 1982, for a survey of bubbles, nms, and

peso problems.

Both the new theories and the historical record are

open to various interpretations.

Discussing the need for a lender

of last resort Solow cautiously notes (1981, p.241):
"All the theorist can say is that there is a potentially sound argl.l!'!Ent
that rests on the unstable propagation of disturbance through the
financial system, beyond the bounds of what ordinary prudence can be
expected to cope with...

One could argue, with some justice, that

a confidence-worthy and confidence-inspiring nnnetary-financial system
is a public good."
IX> era.shes result mainly from the accumulation of inevitable
microeconomic 111:perfections or ma.1nly from macroeconomic mismanagement
by foolish goveI'l"lJJl:!nts?

The

1920s and 1930s provide experiences very

nruch in the mind of today's financial actors, and it

may

be useful to

dwell briefly on that experience, which witnessed massive defaults by
La.tin ~rican LDCs.

The

literature is replete with stories of micro

economic imperfections in the financial markets of the 1920s, which
in

many

instances is an overly polite

way

of describing what went on

-9-

between bond salespersons and borrowing tyrants.

Yet when all is said

and done, one CCXIES back to sharing the conclusion of young Wallich:
"If the depression of the 1930's had been mild, and if the steady
expansion of world trade and capital exports had continued thereafter,
defaults probably would have been infrequent and could have been
settled without JlD.lCh difficulty.··" (Wallich, 1943, p.321).
'lliis, one may add, seems quite plausible even though in those days
there was not an International Monetary Fund.

There were plenty of

mechanisms intennediating between bondholding "widows and orphans" and
borrowing countries, which were used to carry out what today we would
call debt rescheduling exercises and stabilization plans. 'lhese include
the ottoman Public Debt Administration, the Financial Coomittee of the
league.of Nations, and the several ad-hoc financial missions to Latin
~rican countries, representing bondholders associations, but closely
linked.to authorities in lending countries.

See

Frieden 1981,

Fritsch 1979, and Ruggie 1982.
Other s1m:1.larities and differences between bond lending 1n the
1920s and bank lending today offer a promising field for research.
Price level expectations then were, of course, different from those
of today, encouraging longer tenn contracts denaninated 1n dollars
and pounds.

Inflation in key currencies has eroded even domestic bond

markets 1n major countries, and indexing has proven to be a far from
adequate substitute for stable price level expectations.

News about

major borrowers were then quickly translated into changes 1n open
market bond quotations, while today bank secrecy helps to hide such
news, or at least delay their dissemination (also fueling ruroors and
fluctuations 1n the prices of bank shares which may be roore destablizing

-10than fluctuations in bond prices).

Borrowing by issuing securities

restricts the risk of default to specific investors who bought bonds;
bank finance has created a situation richer in exter,,allties, where
the damage of any default could go well beyond the defaulting country
and its creditors.

Bonds offered, of course, the mre sensible

arrangement of financing long-tenn investments with long-term debt,
while bank financing has engaged in remarkable feats of maturity
transfonna.tion.

It remains to be seen whether the regime of bank

lending coupled with discreet scheduling to handle unforeseen shocks
will prove mre resistant to defaults and repudiations than the old
bond system, and whether the avoidance of educative crunches and
bankruptcies is a "slippery slope leading down to widespread state
support for, and bailing out of the banking system" (See Colchester
1981; also Cooper and Truman 1971; Diaz Alejandro 1981; Faton and
Gersovitz 1981; and Sachs and Cohen 1982). These conjectures were
tested during 1982, but under circumstances different fran those
of 1928-33.

It is ironic that the shift toward bank. lending was

partly induced by the regulations introduced during the 1930s to
avoid abuses in bond and security markets.

Note also that during

1982 the n~s making bankers and their supervisors nervous were not
only Mexico and Poland, but also-International Harvester, .AE.G
Telefunken and rane Petroleum.
Gainers and losers. Ass~ first that lenders of last resort
exist, that real interest rates are at their "normal" long-run levels,
and that rules of the gam? for trade and credit are steady and allow
substantial international nows of goods and bonds.

Who gains and

loses fran infonna.tional inperfections in credit markets? In particular,
do LDCs gain or lose from them? And woo within LDCs reap the gains
or bear the costs?

-11The 1970s showed that 100st LOCs did not receive significant
anounts of nedium-tenn private credit.

In

Barte

cases (e.g., India)

there is a presumption that government authorities chose not to borrow
In others, even if demand existed (at less than

at conmercial terms.

astronomical interest rates), the presumption is that lenders sinJ>ly
rationed out borrowers not regarded as creditworthy, i.e., no private
loans were forthcoming at

"any"

price.

It is difficult to believe

that in these LDCs there are~ projects yielding sufficiently high
social rates of return, including suitable calculations for the foreign
exchange needed to service loans, to justify comnercial bor.row1ng.
There is a prima fac:1e

case that either informa.tional imperfections,

or other type of inperfections, clog up lending channels.

.Am:mg the

latter one can imagine organizational flaws aroong potential borrowers,
including misguided economic policies.

On

the lending side one can

add the conjecture that information-ga thering could have significant
economies of scale, and the potential market of sane LDCs may not be
large enough to justify the necessary allocation of loan officers.
Other imperfections, however, appear to offer potential gains
for the m::>re creditworthy LDCs (e.g., the NICs), in the sense that
those flaws discussed earlier tend to expand the supply of credit at
going market rates.

'lbat credit canes with few strings attached during

the hypothesized normal conditions, allowing the borrower substantial
room to carry out its spending plans.

The latter, of course, may be

sensible investment projects, or even involve a wise sm::x>thing out
of consurrption (not all consurrption loans are necessarily "deadweight",
see Ea.ton and Gersovitz 1981), or loans may be used upon arms consumption,
or foolish investments.

In the latter case, repaynent problems are

likely even under tranquil macroeconanic conditions.

-12-

I.eaving aside "sensible" cons'LD'lption loans, a good test of any
financial system is how successf'ul it is in transferring resources
toward capital fonna.tion earning sufficiently high social rates of

return to conpensate lenders and leave a SUI'1)lus for borrowers.
Under these non-zero-sum circumstances everyone benefits, or at
least no one loses.
There is sooe evidence that Jlllch WC borrowing during the 1970s
went into capital fonna.tion arxl that it did not reduce dooestic
savings

The

effort.

See

sachs 1981 and Bacha and Diaz Alejandro 1982.

evidence, however, is sort for several reasons.

Such aggregate

data, particularly on dooestic savings, is notoriously shaky.

One

wonders, to give an exarrple, how Argentine anns purchases since 1976
are registered 1n the national accotmts.

Even if accurate regarding

aggregate am:>tmts, the data are silent on the quality of investment
projects.

Casual eIJi)iricisrn will turn up doubtful investment projects

carried out by both public and private agents in

many

NICs which

borrowed heavily during the 1970s. Note that a negative correlation
betweeen risk spreads charged to different cotmtries and those cotmtries'
ratios of investment to gross domestic product (obtained by sachs 1981,
p.245)
one:

may

sinply reflect that both variables are sensitive to a third

shocks from cormodity price fluctuations or similar disturbances

originating in the world econorey or in nature.

A frost, for exaJ11)le,

may increase coffee prices, relaxing Brazilian balance of payrents

constraints:

this will both allow higher investment rates in Brazil,

~d could also make the cotmtry appear m:>re creditworthy, leading to
a decline in risk spreads.
'!be safest generalization appears to be that whether NIC
borrowing went mainly into ex-ante sound investment projects or into

-13extravagant expenditures (of either a consunption, investment or
military nature) depended mre on borrowing country policies than on
banker's selectivity.

The rrx:>ral-hazard flaws and expected subsidies

described previously blurred in bankers' eyes differences between
Brazilian hydroelectric dams, Chilean shopping centers and Argentine
mirages.
Who benefitted within LDCs from wise borrowing or who bore the

burden of extravagance are difficult questions, having as much to do
with politics as with economics.

Ironically, it seems that in

many

cases private international credit helped strengthen public·enterprises
in LDCs.

Even the 1982 nationalization of banks in Mexico was (partly)

explained by the need to reassure international capital markets of the
soundness of those institutions.
also be disconcerting:

'!he incidence of extravagance can

those politicians responsible for excessive

spending and borrowing in Mexico dur:1-ng 1981-82 may end up their tenure
as heroes, while those who follow may have to face unpleasant econanic
choices.

Behind the politicians, of course, a rcyriad of econanic agents

will benefit from successful investment programs or suffer fran "after
the fall" stabilization plans.
Many

LDC borrowers, both public and private, benefitted during

the 1970s from credit conditions which, until 1980, t'lllned out to be
quite attractive, even when taking into account risk premia, fees
and conrnissions.
fonnation was low.

The price of either extravagance or sensible capital
This, of course, changed since 1980, with the sharp

rise in real interest rates.

The

major losers of the low 1970s real

rates of interest appear to have been oil-rich countries, whose
financial investments at that time earned less than oil left underground.

-14At least during the 1970s, toose were countries which were not in dire
f:lnancial circumstances.
Ma.croeconanic and financial collapse?· '!be dilerrma between
confirming and strengthening noral-hazard considerations and risking
chain-reaction financial bankruptcies becooes salient during recessions
and depressions.

DJring the early 1930s the United States nonetary

authorities allowed massive bank failures aggravating recessionary ·
trends; during 1982 they seened to have (tenl)Orarily and wisely) de
cided to cast to the winds concerns about noral hazard and about in
nationary expectations.

In the vecy short run such action by lenders

of last resort stems t~ urge to 'take the m:>ney and run' felt by
smaller and weaker banks, which,by dcy1ng up soort-tenn credit
and halting nonnal roll-overs,can generate vecy large swings in
net lending.

The

effectiveness of the international financial system

during the 1980s, however, depends nore fundanentally on the rapidity
and vigor of the recovecy by industrialized countries p,om the
recession oft~ early 1980s, and the conta.innent_of protectionist
pressures observed in those countries.
If recession deepens and/or protectionism advances further in
industrialized countries, defaults, reschedulings and even repudiations
will be unavoidable. Rescheduling, under those circumstances, is
unlikely to be feasible at market conditions, even if real interest
rates are at long-tenn normal levels.

A roore con:plex and intriguing

scenario for the 1980s would involve neither deepening Northern recession
nor vigorous recovecy, and neither galloping protectionism nor a return
to liberalizing trends in international trade.

What will Brazil and

South Korea do in this '~ocre' scenario, which could involve a
slow growth in their exports, but also low real interest rates? Will

-15thev continue to service punctually their debt even though net capital
C

-

inflows may be meager and prospects for rapid export growth would be
poor? Note that the default and repudiation option bec~s less
attractive to major. debtors (who do not fear Marines any longer) not
only the higher the expected excess of gross capital innows· over debt service

pa,.VJrents, but also the better its export prospects to major creditors,
and the faster the expected frontier technological change in those
industrialized countries.

Even if expected net 1nnows are low, Brazil

will be reluctant to default and repudiate its debt for fear of having
its links to suppliers of advanced machinery and technology cut off,
and its other trade links harassed.

Besides the turm:>il which would

be created 1n the short run by the drying up of even trade credits, the
option of violently cutting off capital account links while maintaining
trading ones with major creditors does not seem open for the foreseeable
future.
Whatever happens, however, it is clear that no one is going to
cart aw~ debt-fjnanced Brazilian hydroelectric dams, and that there
are limits to the austerity and policy measures which can be dictated fran

abroad to countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

Complex and even

dangerous bargaining games between large borrowers and those acting on
behalf of lenders are already under way, covering not just balance of
payments and macroeconomic policies, but also ~country regulations
over direct foreig;l investments and even foreign policy stances.

Some

LDCs may be able to maintain a greater degree of policy autonoiey than
others, under these circumstances, just as during the 1930s Brazil
enlarged its room for policy maneuver,even as that of Argentina shrank.
The IMF

could pl~ an ~rtant role during the 1980s, but tm1ch

depends on how it adapts to the times, a matter to which we will return
below.

-16III. International nonetary arrangements and domestic financial
markets 1n sane LOCs.
Exchange rates of key currencies and I.DC opt1ma.l pegs.

IDCs

expressed unhappiness with noating rates am:,ng key currencies shortly
after their adoption.

'lhl.s was regarded by many observers as yet another

sign of LOC economic obtuseness, though reasons for such an LOC stance
were fairly.obvious, even if the wisdan of their advocacy of fixed rates
for major currencies was debatable (see Diaz Alejandro 1975).

Today

unhappiness with nexible exchange rates has becone widespread, as
foreign exchange markets appear as turbulent as stock and other asset
markets.

Yet alternatives to noating, under present and likely circum
LOCs have been forced

stances, remain unappealing for key currencies.

to reconsider their exchange rate policies even in the few cases where

their donestic circ1.UJ1Stances were tranquil.

Traditional "peggers"

have had to think about their opt1mal peg. External and domestic shocks,
as well as changing priorities of domestic policies,have also led to
reconsideration whether to crawl without preannounced rules, or to
preannounce schedules of minidevalua.tions, or to have nultiple rates,
or even to noat like the big boys.
Although faith 1n stable big brothers

has

eroded, optirm..un-currency

area considerations still lead roost IDCs to peg:

90 out of the 114 LOCs

whose exchange rate policies were classified by the IMF as of June 1980
declared themselves to be pegging, generally to the U.S. dollar, the
French franc, the SDR, or to other basket currency.

Careful en:pirical

work has established that for the vast majority of countries maintaining

a peg vis a vis another currency or basket, externally :induced instability
(e.g., nuctuations aroong key currencies) 1n effective nominal and real
exchange rates increased between 1966-1971 and 1973-1979.

Seeking

-17greater stability, a growing nuni>er of LDCs have switched their pegs
to fore~ currency baskets.
and Bacha 1981).

(See Brodsky, Helleiner and san;>son 1981;

The trend and gyrations of the U.S. dollar since

1979 have shown that the choice of a peg is far rran a minor matter,
as Central

Bank

officials 1n Argentina, Chile

and

Uruguay have belatedly

found out.
There has been a pr1ma facie case that the increased instability
of LDC effective exchange rates induced by key-currency fluctuations
has

a harmful incidence on LOCs, increasing term-of-trade instability,

and canplicating the management of LDC international assets and liabilities.
Quantification of these effects, however, has proven elusive, so the
~tude of the welfare costs 1nposed on I.Des by the floating rate
regime is rooot, and could turn out to be minor at least for those LOCs
with relatively sophisticated policy tools at their disposal.
Basket-pegging , of course, can offsets~ of the instability
arising from key-currency gyrations.

The

1970s witnessed a vast

expansion of the literature on the opt.1ma.l peg, mercifully surveyed by
by John Williamson 1982a. Williamson argues that one point on which
there is (alnDst) conplete agreement is that choice of the unit to act
as peg should be ma.de with the aim of stabilizing s~thing, rather than
with the object of optimizing anything.
distinct aspects to exchange rate policy:
and rules governing changes in the peg.

He argues that there are two
the unit to which to peg,
He concludes that the choice

of the unit to which a country pegs its currency. should be guided
principally by the pursuit of internal balance (being content that
external balance is satisfied on average over the medium tenn), and
that this requires peeging to a basket of currencies reflecting the
direction and the elasticity of total trade.

I.onger-tenn questions,

notably neutralizing inflation differentials,p ronDting payments adjustnent,

-18-

and in{>osing an external discipline, should be handled by changes in the
value of the peg, rather than by innuencing the unit to which the
currency is pegged.

Finally, he notes several attractive features,

fran a cosm:>politan viewpoint, of pegging to the SOR.
SalE qualificatio ns may be ma.de to these conclusions .

'lhe dis

tinction between stabilizatio n and optimizatio n is debatable:

why

stabilize unless there is sore opt1m1zation justifying it? For many
small and ver-y open I.Des the distinction between the choice of peg and the
rules for changing the peg may rema.1n academic:

their size and

possible feebleness of npnetar-y institution s

rule out anything but

may

fixed exchange rates, for opti.rm.nn-currency reasons.

Having

ruled out

"forever", a la Guatemala, changes in the peg for the sake of preserving
the npneyness of the local currency, longer tenn considerati ons, such
as a desire to minimize local inflation, could influence whether to
peg to, say, the U.S. dollar, to the Pound sterling, or to the French
franc (a choice not so theoretical for small Caribbean islands, for exarrple).
A second qualificatio n involves the need for further work on

how

the

capital account should influence the choice of the peg; with the exception
of Tumovsky 1982, the literature so far has focussed alllPst exclusively
on the current account.

Suppose a countr-y trades mainly with Germany

but borrows in New York:

how should this affect its choice of peg?

Given the high degree of capital J1Pbility since the late 1960s, the
short-run swings in the capital account have becone a major preoccupati on
of Central Bankers in semi-indus trialized l.DCs, an issue worth some
discussion.
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dilentna.S and exper:1.nents.

Partic ularly in LDCs with

a histor y of errati c inflat ion and ma.croeconanic turbul ence, the inter
action of exchange rate policy with local and intern ationa l financ ial
markets has become a matte r of seriou s concern during the 1970s and early
1980s. A pennis sive 1ntern ationa l nnneta ry system has allowed room for
experi menta tion; as with b o ~ , the experimentation has result ed
in
some hits and some errors .
A centra l policy questi on is whether to atterrp t to loosen the
links between domestic and intern ationa l financ ial marke ts. Floati ng
rates perfon n some of this delink ing functi on in indus trializ ed count
ries,
althou gh experi ence has shown that their performance in this respec t
has
been far from satisf actory , and some observ ers have called for polici
es
to widen the breach (Tobin 1978). Note that aroong indus trializ ed
count ries, with the major excep tions of Qennany and the United State s,
there. is a widespread recog nition that short- term financ ial nows can
pose problems for macroeconomic management; nnst of those count ries do
1n fact maint ain restri ction s of variou s sorts on short- tenn banking
opera tions, restri ctions which are accept ed in the OECD Code on Capita
l
Movements (Bertrand 1981) and of course by the IMF'.
The nnst specta cular LDC experiments have involv ed the combi
nation of libera lizati on of d~st ic financ ial marke ts, a loosen ing of
links between domestic and intern ationa l capita l marke ts, and the use
of pre-announced or fixed exchange rates as weapons to reduce dorres tic
inflat ion. Examples includ e Argen tina, Chile and Uruguay since 1978,
culmi nating in assort ed catast rophe s around 1981-82. 'lhose polici es
did lead to a (temporary) reduc tion in inflat ion, massive capita l inflow
and increa ses in foreig n exchange reserv es.

s

They also led to a trend

toward real appre ciatio ns of the exchange rate and, eventu ally to
rever sals of the capita l flows, financ ial panics , crisis devalu ations

and
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a renewal of 1nflationary pressures. in a context of severe recessions.
J)Jring the euphoric 'miracle' phase the external debt and reserves
expanded with great speed; the busts also proceeded with renarkable
nornentum. reducing reserves but leaving behind serious debt servicing
probl~.

Ex-post explanations for these melancholy results include

external shocks. failures to bring public sector deficits under control.
and excessive generosity to workers (full wage indexation making real
wages rigid downwards). Of greater inportance were errors in assuming
that domestic financial markets needed no roore effective control than
spot apple markets, faith in crude versions of the Law of One Price.
and in automatic nechanisms of adjustnent for obtaining balance of
payments equilibrium with full enployment.

It is remarkable that those

advocating and in;>lenenting Southern Cone domestic financial liberalization
overlooked or ignored the fact that in the case of the paradigJna.tic
experiment in successful dorrestic financial liberalization. that of
South Korea during the 1960s, nnst of the financial institutions were
owned or controlled by the government. facilitating prudential super
vision of both national and international financial transactions and
giving the government a powerful innuence over credit allocation.
(See Gurley, Patrick and Shaw 1965, p.45.)

Indeed, much of the

literature advocating financial liberalization has Cortt>ared LOC
"repressed" markets with ieythical perfect credit markets with full
infonnation, misleading policy makers into believing that if only
ceilings on interest rates were rerooved, a sound, coopetitive and
vigorous financial sector would spontaneously appear.

Little attention

was given (until the 1981-82 catastrophes) to irreduceable informational
1.nperfections. nor to the rich variety of financial systems and
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are hardly perfect credit markets with Ml information.
Tendencies found in industrialized countries toward the generation
of oligopolistic financial groups and conglanerates, checked in some
of those countries by regulatory legislation, became virulent after
LDC financial liberalizations whose analytical underpimings went
little beyond demand and supply schedules for credit (Foxley 1982).
It

may

also be noted that the related misuse of the small country

assunption for borrowing in international credit markets led to a
Southern Cone belief that the current account consequences of increas1ng].y
overvalued exchange rates could be easily covered by tapping the
infirrl,tely elastic supply of external funds.

The liberalization of

domestic financial markets under Southern Cone circumstances generated
considerable short-tenn transactions, but no substantial and pennanent
increase in private fixed capital fonna.tion.

Real interest rates,

measured in a m.unber of plausible ways, remained inexplicably high.
Beyond fairly predictable explanations, an interesting conjecture links
those high interest rates to mral hazard imperfections eI!l)hasized
in this paper:

financial inte~diaries in trouble, shielded by

portfolio secrecy and expectations of a bail-out, seek fresh deposits

from the public by offering ever-higher interest rates (Baeza Valdes,
1982).
The control and elimination of innation has proven to be quite
difficult and costly in both industrialized countries and LOCs.

The

experience of Southern Cone countries, in particular, has highlighted
the dangers of dog,natic liberalizations in the midst of macroeconanic
turbulence.

It is now widely reco~zed that maintaining macroeconomic
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contro l during the transit ion toward

DDre

stable conditi ons is a difficu lt

task which is likely to require scm? fonn of exchange contro ls over
capita l outnow s and inflow s.

See

McKinnon 1982. Given the freque ntly

large differe ntials in dooest ic and foreign intere st rates, taxes,
rather than purely quanti tative control ,seem the proper instrum ents for
the task of reducing destab ilizing short-t enn capita l novene nts.
,F.nornous rents could be capture d by those arbitra ging between local
and interna tional capita l market s; because of both ma.croeconcmic and
pruden tial consid eration s it would not be desirab le to el1m1nate
those rents by sinl>ly allow1ng nore private agents into the busine ss •.
Taxes or contro ls will not doubt have

many

leaks and will introdu ce

ineffic iences ; the point is that under soroo circumstances they may
avoid worse ones.
Interna tional liquid ity, the LDCs and the great gold swindl e.
At least under some plausib le defini tions, aggreg ate intern ationa l
reserve s increas ed dramat ically during the 1970s, while reserv e
corrposition was also drastic ally altered . Neithe r event was foresee n
during the 1960s,much less planne d. The increas e in the price of gold
was the major cause for both events ; by the late 1970s gold had bee~

de facto the major interna tional reserve asset, althoug h its price
fluctua tions 11m1ted its classic al reserve flmctio n.
During the 1960s the LDCs were enco ~d, if not pressu red,

to hold reserve increas es in the fonn of interes t-earni ng key-cu rrency
denominated assets. The dollar was said to be not just as good as gold;
as it could earn intere st, it was said to be better .

Choosing gold

was regarde d as an unfrien dly act, and LOCs were lecture d on the

irratio nality of gold-h olding.

Three- fourths of the world reserve gold
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France, Italy, Switzer land, the Netherl ands, and Belgitlll , countrie s
which register ed massive (paper) profits as a result of gold price increas es.
Brodsky and Ssrnpson, 1981, estimate those profits at rore than $300

billion .

Gains to LOCs from the gold price increas e, includin g those

from the liquida tion of IMF gold, are tiny next to that figure.
The

instrum ent intended as the princip al reserve asset of the

interna tional roonetary system, the SDR, accounted for around 2 percent in
the growth of interna tional reserve s during the 1970s, and the figure is
unlikely to be much higher during the 1980s. Even without the "link",
LDCs would be today better off had the increase in interna tional liquidi ty
register ed since the late 1960s taken the form of expanded SDR allocati ons.
Ironica lly, the countrie s which benefit ted from the increase in gold
prices during the 1970s now argue that further SDR allocati ons are not
needed and would be inflatio nary. By the early 1980s mo-gold interna tional
reserve s had fallen sharply relative to trade; during 1982 some LDCs
were reporte d to be selling some of their meager gold holding s.

IMF

quotas have slipped way behind world trade and payments imbalances,
reduci.ng access to its low-con ditional ity faciliti es.
Not surprisi ngly, the fashiona ble nostalg ia for the gold standard
found in the industr ialized countrie s has found few echoes 1n LDCs, m::>st
of which rememe r those days as involvin g subjuga tion to colonia l powers
or as 1rrpos1ng on their sovereig n but weak economies substan tial instabi lity
(Triffin 1964).

IT. International financial institutions
The

International r-t>netary Fund and other lenders of last

Those who launched the IMF in 1944 expected a world with adjustable

resort.

but m:>stly fixed rates, and a low degree of international private capital
m:>bility.

Is the IMF really necessary in a world of noating rates and

in which private finance seems plentiful? Before 1944, after all,
there were some periods of tranquil international prosperity without
an IMF.
Earlier pages noted that many small countries (not all LDCs)
prefer to maintain parities pegged to key currencies or baskets of
them.

Even authorities in charge of key currencies have not foresworn

intervening in exchange markets.

Exchange rates, in other words, will

not bear the full burden of adjusting to shocks to the balance of
payments in the foreseeable future.

'lhere will remain deficits and

surpluses generating financial transactions.

Earlier pages also noted

microeconomic and macroeconanic reasons which indicate that purely
private financial markets may not be optimal for handling deficits and
surpluses; infonnational and organizational naws may lead to circurt'r
stances where the required finance will not be forthcaning at a
reasonable cost when it is m:>st needed.

Countries could be pushed into

eirergency adjust~nt ~asures with substantial externalities and which
•
are less than opt:1.ma.l from both national and international viewpoints.
This is why leaving aside advocates of a return to the gold standard,
inrrediate world revolution, or free banking, there is widespread
agreement that a desirable international roonetary and financial system
should have at its center sornething like an IMF, to act as a lender
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and partly different to how those Central Banks act vis-a-vis their
conrnercial banking and financial systeI?I.$.

'!his systemic consideration

also explains wh.,v LDCs which are harsh critics of the Il-1F also advocate
a large increase in its quotas.

Events during the second half of

1982, when the U.S. administration used its muscle as international
lender of last resort (ILLR) partly to undermine the foreign policy
independence of Brazil and Mexico, confinrEd the iJJl:)ortance to LDCs
of multilateral financial institutions.
Neither at the national nor at the international levels there is
a robust theory of lender of last resort; we have instead history and
ad hoc jude,nents (see Solow 1981). First note differences between the
IMF and Central Banks:

the latter have in m:>st col.lltries a

good

deal

of power over their national financial institutions, even when located
abroad, while the IMF must generally wait until Central Banks come to
it before it can innuence their policies.

National Central Banks,

however, have tighter limits on their ability to "print" internationally
acceptable rooney than the IMF has.

It appears plausible to argue that

whoever acts as international lender of last resort should have enough
of those funds which are likely to be demanded during a crisis to make
its reassurances credible.

It should also be on speaking ternis both

with potential custc:mers for funds, and with those providing its
financial nruscle.

It must be able to roove very fast during emergencies.

Since at least the first oil shock there have been doubts, on all counts,
whether the IMF is really up to an ILLR role.

Its lending potential

has not kept up with possiblebalance of payments deficits, and its
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long estrangement fran
not been overcane.

many

LOCs, including key ones like Brazil, has

Its rules call for time-consuming negotiations

and procedures.
During 197~1980 the IMF s ~ on the

way

toward enlarging its

lending capacity and adopting roore flexible lending conditions, culmi
nating 1n a large loan to India•.'lhl.s trend was suddenly stopped during
1981, under pressure from the new U.S. adm1n1stration.

Events during

1982 have persuaded at least sore skeptics of the wisdom of the 19791980 initiatives, although it remains to be· seen how forcefully those
initiatives will be pursued.

The

crucial issues remain both a major

increase 1n the IMF financial resources and a substantial improvement
in its lending practices.
John Williamson has given us another helpful survey of
crucial points 1n this area (Williamson 1982b). His discussion can. be
criticized as m1n1mizing past IMF inflexibility 1n dealing with LOCs,
especially 1n the Western Hemisphere, and as exaggerating the theoretical
(in contrast with the practical) grounds for advocating the use of

credit ceilings 1n stabilization plans.

However, his estimates indicating

the need to raise IMF resources to at least SDR 100 billion (from SDR
61 billion) and mst of his suggestions on
lending practices are persuasive.

how

to liberalize IMF

Indeed, his characterization of

the IMF theoretical position as eclectic and his conclusion that
criticisms of the IMF are largely misplaced will be tested, inter alia,
by how that institution reacts to his proposals over the next few years.
Few would deny that the IMF, or any II.LR, should attach some form
of econanic 'conditionality' on its loands.

(See !:ell 1981 for a masterful

review of tre evolution of conditionality).

Given the lack of con-
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F'lmd patrons (contrast macroeconomic policy in France and the United
States),· the case for IMF conditional ity focused narrowly on balance
of payrrents targets is strengthene d.

It is true that observed per

formance in the balance of paynents is the result both of dorrestic
policies and factors beyooo the country's control.

Yet a number of

indicators, such as staple prices and market shares, could be used
to evaluate performance, and failure to neet

agreed

targets.

Note

that the conpensatory facilities of the IMF have accumulated experience
in this area.
It is the business of the F\md to insist on balance of paynents
targets consistent with the repaynent of its loans, to ronitor closely performance in this area,and to susoend its credit(eith er subsidized or cheap
relative to altemative s)to coi.mtries which do not repay prorrptly without a good
reason, such as unexpected exogenous shocks.

It is not the business

of the IMF to make loans conditional on policies whose connection to
the balance of payrrents in the short or even nedium run is tenuous,
such as food subsidies, utility rates, controls over foreign corporation s,
or whether the banking system is public or private.

It was a brilliant

administrat ive stroke for the IMF staff to develop "the rronetary approach
to the balance of paynents" during the 1950s~ allowing the translation
of balance of paynents targets into those involving domestic credit,
but for

many

LDCs the assurrptions needed to validate such translation

have becone less and less convincing.
Focusing on balance of paynents targets would keep the IMF
away from the roore political aspects of short run macroeconomic policy
ma.king.

Countries could, of course, actively solicit IMF advice on
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Ml expression to its views on inflation control, opt1mal trade
regulations, food subsidies, etc.
Balance of payments now targets will be naturally intertwined
with estimates of the stock of a country's foreign debt; a country asking
the IMF for a loan will have to discuss its other outstanding loans,
if nothing else, to clarify priorities in debt servicing. IMF conditionality
thus inevitably involves this institution in discussions about debt
11mlts and servicing, including rescheduling exercises.

All of this

could in principle be handled so as to reduce uncertainty and infonnational
naws, so that both private lenders and borrowing countries, as well as
innocent bystanders,could on balance
counterfactual.

As

mn

relative to a laissez faire

noted earlier,lack of resources and overlv 1ntru.c;ivP.

notions of conditionality have kept the IMF from fully playing that
constructive role.

Until there are clear indications that a 'new'

IMF has come into being sane countries

may

continue to handle their

debt, and possible debt reschedulings, on their own.

To make even a

'new' IMF a kind of central conmittee of an international credit cartel
would under nonnal circumstances be a remedy worse than the disease, at
least from the viewooint of manv borrowiru? countries.
Difficulties servicing the Mexican external debt during 1982
showed that not even the Reagan administration expects financial crises
and potential bank failures to be handled by the magic of the market

place.

As noted by the managing director of the TIIIF, in a corrmendable

brief period the central banks, the Bank for International SettlernentS::BIS),
the United States Treasury, the cornrercial banks and the IMF acted in
full cooperation.

Similarly, the gove:rrrnent of the Federal· Republic
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on Gennan banks of Polish difficulties with punctual debt servicing.
While these two cases showed the efficacy of lenders of last resort,
the melodrama.tic collapse of the Luxembourg subsidiary of the Banco
Ambrosiano and the failure of the Bank of Italy to back any of its
debts underline the ambiguities of the 1975 Basle concordat annng
k{ty

central banks, which laid down a division of responsibility designed

to prevent any element of an international bank escaping supervision,
and presumably having access to some lender of last resort.

So

far

the quantitative and psychological inpacts of the rescue operations for
Poland and Mexico exceed by far those of the Arnbrosiano affaire, so
nruch s6 that one detects annng

S()J'l)a

concerned observers an eagerness

to witness "exenq:>lary" bankruptcies for banks and "exenq:>lary"
stabilization plans for countries, ·so as to avoid validating DD.lch
,too obviously the subsidy expectations and JOOral hazard features of
international lending.

'!he search must be on for victims too weak,

unpopular, or small for their sacrifice to shake the financial system.

In the meanwhile, low quotations for their shares and difficulties
in the inter-bank deposit market are expected to give the boldest banks
a salutary fright.
The key lesson of the second half of 1982 may tum out to be that
under present political and economic conditions the real ILLR is the
United States government, whose Treasury and Federal Reserve can JOObilize,
by the proverbial stroke of a pen, vast sums of dollars with 100re secrecy
and speed than the IMF, or even the BIS.

The mechanisms available to
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ex-ante Congressional checks.

Big and politically centralized LDCs,

such as Brazil and Mexico, will prefer 1n a crisis to deal directly
with the U.S. governnent.
may

not come ex-post.

IMF blessings to bilateral deals

may

or

Cne may conjecture that big borrowers will

trade off foreign policy autonany (less opposition to

u.s.

policies 1n

Central Anerica and 1n GATI') for m:>re resources and sOIOOWhat m:>re lenient
econanic conditions.
Over the longer term, an IMF counting with both ample resources
as well as the trust of m:>st of its members could help not only to
corrplenent the lender of last resort facilities of national central
banks but also serve as a forum for effective coordination of national
macroeconomic policies.

IAlring

1980-1982 LDCs were severely hit by

the side effects of anti-inflationary policies 1n industrialized
countries, particularly 1n the United States, without having the oppor
tunity to have their case heard 1n potentially responsive fora.

Extravcif.sant

interest rates directly 1ncreased the debt burden, and 1ndirectly led
to low pr:1mary product prices and a lower demand for LDC manufactured
exports.

Recession 1n the North induced protectionist pressures, which

even when resisted hanned the outlook for LDC exports, and hence
reduced their creditworth1ness.

A reinvigorated IMF, perhaps together

with a new GA'IT, could a,ct as a forum where the 1nterconnections among
macroeconomic, trade, and financial policies, North and South, could be
discussed, and brought under a m1n1mum of coherence.

It is conceivable

that such an IMF could play a worldwide cmmtercyclical role, as visualized
by scrne of its founding fathers, using its power to issue SDRs and by
a nnre vigorous use of its compensatory financinp.: facility, which could
become an inportant automatic stabilizer for the world economy.

-l
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North and South, it would also involve zero-sum aspects, making one
pess1m:1stic as to the 1.Jmediacy of this 'secorxi caning'.

Cne cannot

increase the voting weight of the South, for eXBIIl)le, without reducing
that of the North.

A rore technical and "built-in" approach to debt

scheduling could reduce opportunities for some Northern groups to have
their governnents link credit rollovers to changes in host country
rules on direct foreiE'}'l investment and in their energy and even foreign
policies.

Those in the Reagan administration, for exan;>le, who have

successfully exploited the financial difficulties of Brazil and Mexico
to advance U.S. political hegerJDny in the Western Hemisphere would
naturally be reluctant to work for an expanded and autonom:>us IMF.
Other nultilateral institutions as financial interrrV?diaries.
As with the IMF, one may question whether the 1944 justifications for

creating a World Bank remain valid for the 1980s.

In what follows the

role of the World Bank and of other multilateral lending agencies, such
as the Inter-~rican and Asian development banks, as financial inter
DEdiaries will be separated from their role as dispensers of concessional
finance, or aid, as with IDA and other "soft" windows.
Why should the World Bank borrow in mre-or-less open financial

markets to lend to Brazil, which has .had direct access to those markets
on its own? Why would Brazil want to use the World Bank as intermediary,
anyway?

The answer must be sought again in the informational ~erfections

of capital markets, which can be reduced by multilateral banks, whose
solvency is backed by financially powerful countries and who can
exploit econanies of scale in ronitoring borrowers.

Faced with rationing
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borrowing channels which may expand credit availability and reduce costs.
Brazilian borrowing from the World -~, in turn, will increase its
creditworthiness

anDng

private lenders.

These considerations apply

a fortiori to I.Des whose direct access to international private credit
markets is less nu1d than that of Brazil. While international capital
markets revived since the 1960s beyond 1944 expectations, the World Bank
still has the role assigned to it in Bretton Woods, i.e •• to substitute
partly for private international markets for long tenn bonds• which
collapsed in the 1930s.

Note that even in industrialized countries with

fairly well developed credit markets. there are public institutions
acting as financial intenrediaries or guarantors to channel resources
toward borrowers overlooked or neglected by purely private markets;
examples include the Small Business Administration and student loans
in the United States.

In contrast with the IMF. then, the role of nn.u.tilateral banks
is not to engage in short-tenn crisis lending _but to finance investment
opportunities with high social rates of return which are not being
banked by private sources. They will want to have their own fonn of
"conditionality", which may range from a m1n1malist one dealing with
specific projects, to a maximalist conditionality involving all aspects
of development policies of borrowing countries.

This is not the place

to rehearse the stale 1960s argurrents on this form of conditionality,
nor the related debate on project vs program lending.

(See

Diaz Alejandro 1971 and Albert O. Hirschman and Richard M. Bird 1968
for discussion of these issues.) New circumstances during the early
1980s, however, warrant a few remarks.
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directly ·and via multilateral banks, the option to do either reduces
the leverage which the latter institutions have over that type of
borrowing cowi.try.

At the s~ tire, abrupt 'graduations' of NICs from

nultilateral banks during the circumstances of the early 1980s appear
unwise.

Multilateral banks during the 1980s could pioneer in exper~nting

with financial instruments and loans with nexible repa.yment schedules
(e.g., contingent on conmxiity prices) and various fonns of indexing.
Co-financing of loans with private lenders, as practiced by the
International Finance Corporation, could play a useful but m:xiest role
in expanding the volurre of finance, so long as this practice does not
distort priorities in the rest of the World Bank system.
LOCs without direct access to international credit markets will
have to rely on both the internediating role of multilateral banks,
and on multilateral and bilateral aid, if they want to invest beyond what
they save, either temporarily or for a longer tenn.

Am::>ng LDCs,

the dependence of sub-Saharan Africa on multilateral institutions and
on aid remains singularly acute, and worthy of special emergency
attention (Helleiner 1982).

Willy-nilly, this type of LDC will continue

to participate 1n a "dialogue" with multilateral lenders and donors
about.their investrrent plans and other developrrent policies.

Apparently

correct conventional wisdom argues that such a dialogue is best handled
multilaterally rather than bilaterally; it is therefore strange that
the Reagan administration appears to favor both tighter "developrrent
conditionality" and a weakening of multilateral institutions.

v.

~nories 1 dreams, renections.
International m:>netary and financial aITangements have been

throughout history an aspect of the world econaey roost obviously con
nected to political power.

The

Pax Rcrnana, the Pax Britannica and the

Pax Anericana·ha.d counterparts in coinage and-credit.

Between Pax and

Pax chances for panics and depressions grew (Kindleberger 1973).

It may

be argued that although in the early 1980s the hegeroonic power of the
United States has been seriously eroded, a great deal of consensus
aroong capitalist industrial powers rema1ns regarding desirable1nternationa l
economic arrangerrents, so that a repetition of past inter-Pax catastrophes
may

be avoided (Ruggie 1982).

Yet the diffusion of coomercial, financial

and political power of the early 1980s remains historically unprecedented,
generating large actual and potential frictions am:>ng major international
actors, including those arising from att~ts by the United States to
reassert hegeroon_y and discipline am::>ng its allies.

This dangerous

situation, however, can also be interpreted as a necessary precondition
to building a roore equitable and participatory international econanic
system.
M:>st LDCs having econcmic develo~nt as their highest priority
are passive spectators in this turnoil.

'Ibey are often lectured to

"adjust to the realities of the 1980s".

If the adjustment is conpatible

with the maintenance of a minimum rate of developrrent, they are likely
to go along.

Most, however, are unlikely to put up with a pseudo

adjustment involving long periods of stagnation.

Rather, they will

face possible new international .realities by reorienting their develop
ment strategies.

Quite sensibly, they will not for very long "adjust"

by having high rates of unemplo~nt and excess capacity, and wasting
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opportunities for capital fo:rnation.

Sane

LOCs, of course, are 1n a

better position to carry out such reorientation than others, due to
larger dom:!stic markets and a greater availability and willingness to
use policy :instrunents.

As a participant at the IMF/World Bank Toronto

neeting of September 1982 put it: "Brazil is too big to fall :into the
abyss."
A reorientation of LOC development policies would involve, as
during the 1930s, a greater en:pha.sis on inport substitution, this time
perhaps :involving roore South-South cooperation. '!be new strateRV
eould also :involve :1.nport-postponement and investments :intensively using
non-traded goods (e.g., housing); these elements are consistent with
greater attention to the welfare needs of the population at the bottom
of the incone scale.

If st8g1lation and protectionism in the North

become chronic, hanpering the reverse real transfer involved :in debt
servicing, financial a?Tangenents would have to be reexamined and
renegotiated.

'Ihe IMF, the World Bank and other multilateral lending

agencies would have to exercise sane 1mag1nation to serve as roore than
debt-collecting agencies.
'Ihis scenario, gloan:1.er for the North than for sane development
prone LOCs, still remains an unlikely one.

Whatever happens, the coni:lination

of business cycles in major capitalist economies with contractually rigid
loan agreements will continue to generate periodic North-South financial
frights which were alm::>st forgotten during the 1950s and 1960s by
relatively sroooth and high growth and the miniscule debt with which
LDCs ~rged fran World War II.

It is doubtful that there will

be

rm.1ch

-36success in srooothing the Northern business cycle during the 1980s, so
that instability in the prices of Southern export cormooities (a.lm:>st
declared a non-problem during the 1960s) is also likely to remain high.
Note that anong highly indebted LOCs one finds both oil-1.rrl)orters
and oil-exporters; a fall in oil prices may help some (e.g. ,Brazil) while

provoking a crisis in others (e.g., Mexico).

Instability in that price is

likely to hurt both. Che would 1maR:1ne that in a cyclical world financial
arrangerrents would ~rge wn1ch include provisions to deal with con
tingencies such as sharp fluctuations in the prices of key.exports of
borrowing countries, rather than establish fixed repa.yrnent schedules,
cane hell or high water.

Historically, lenders have preferred to use

ad hoc rescheduling rather than ex-ante flexible conditions, probably

because of rooral hazard considerations.

Bank regulators in lending

countries have also preferred, so far, to deal with the issues raised
by roore or less forced rollovers in·an ad hoc fashion.
Both at the national arxi international levels, banks and other
financial intennediaries have come under closer academic and public ·- ·
scrutin,y during the 1970s and early 1980s.

After early enthusiasm for

ending "financial repression" and nnst regulations, sober second thoughts
have appeared.

Few would argue in 1982 that financial 1ntennediation is

just one roore Cart)etitive industry, with no mre externalities than the
apple industry. .At the national level, financial refonn could take
sharply divergent paths, depending on macroeconcmic strategies and also
on the confidence policy makers have on their own administrative capacities,
versus their faith on the public's capability to sift information and
make wise decisions regarding risks and returns.

France has ended up

-37with nationalized banks while the United States may reduce deposit
insurance and force banks to reveal roore information about their portfolios.
Deregulation in the United States will involve some subtle rhetorical
exercises; Henry Wallich, as a member of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, can speak of " ••• building a nnre flexible
and roore competitive banking system••• " a.lmJst in the s~ breadth
that he urges banks " ••• to re~mber that their actions in troubled
situations inpinge on all other banks. '!heir interests will be best
served if they stand together in defense of a COllll'X)n position."
He also advises that " ••• in analyzing [LDC] creditworthiness, ••• banks
should seek out and make available to each other the necessary
infonna.tion."

(Wallich 1982, pp. 1,2 and 3).

Singular advice for the

prorrotion of co~tition!
No country, developed or developing, .can afford not to think
throughthese dilenrnas in the context of their own specific national
circumstances; just copying the financial laws and practices of
another will not do, and relying on old practices
for the 1980s.

may

not be enough

'1he LDCs, preferably acting as a group, also have a

large stake in roonitoring and influencing

how

changes in industrial

countries financial practices affect international capital markets.
Regardless of how each country handles its domestic financial system,
what are the interests of LDCs, or of different types of IDCs, regarding
international financial markets? Should they lobby for laissez-faire
international banking or for greater controls, inevitably to be
exercised roostly by parent industrialized countries?
For semi-industrialized and socialist countries the late 1970s
represented a golden era of borrowing, cheap both in economic and
political terms, thanks to the uncontrolled se~nt of international

banking.

It may be argued that the early 1980s proved that such a

golden era was a passing m:1rage, bound to end in collapse, as in
Southern Cone ~stic financial liberalizations. Granting that the
ease of borrowing tended to encourage domestic mismanagement and
overspending by public and private agents in weak projects (as in the
cases of Argentina and Mexico), in others the unexpected severity of
rnacroeconanic circumstances during 1981-82 is largely responsible
for payments difficulties (as in the Brazilian case).
many

1)Jr1ng

1982

LDCs saw the dollar value of their exports fall sharply• even as

the export quantum grew• provoking charges of dunping by industrialized
countries.

Yet in other cases, such as Colorrt>ia, very prudent policies

have kept the country out of the financial pages of international
newspapers.

During

1982 it has become clear that while an international

lender of last resort is at hand, it will extract its pound of flesh.
Indeed, there are hints that the 1982 crisis may be used by some
industrialized countries, particularly by the United States, to reassert
"discipline", i.e., cartelize bank lending not just to socialist countries
but also to LDCs.

The

cartelization could bring some paternalistic

benefits: making the system less wlnera.ble to crises and eliminating
some foolish loans.

But the dangers to self-reliant borrowers, confident

of their own econanic and political management, are obvious.
Sotrewhat paradoxically, both semi-industrialized and otherLOCs
would be wise in the near tenn to fight for the integrity of the IMF,
even as they press for rore rational IMF "conditionality".

'lbe

~

could

be said regarding the World Bank and other multilateral lending agencies
(and indeed for the GA'I'r). The inl>erial pretensions emanating from
Washington during 1981-82 have underlined the potential benefits to many

-39LDCs of both a lightly regulated internation al banking system and a set
of supporting nw.tilatera l financial agencies, including an IMF which
could act as a genuine II.LR.

'Ibe nru.ltilatera l financial agencies

should play a particularl y 1.n;>ortant role vis-a-vis the poorest LDCs
during the 1980s.
How nruch pressure can LOCs exercise in internation al financial

bargaining? can Southern debts be aggregated into one powerful
bargaining chip? One is skeptical: Mexico is unlikely to want its
debt ltmped with that of Bolivia or even Brazil for bargaining purposes.
Yet deroonstrati on effects aroong debtors could occur during a severe
internation al crisis, leading them to StlSpend sequentiall y nonnal
debt service, as during the early 1930s.

This may be enough to give

at least soIIE semi-indus trialized IDCs a bit of influence to press
for a reexaminati on of reschedulin g and IILR arrangeoont s.

Ideas

put forth at the T.mCTAD Manila conference on reschedulin g and on how
to ameliorate the real consequences of periodic financial scares
inevitable in private financial markets are worth a fresh look.

'lhe

sharing of costs between lenders and borrowers of loan decisions which
ex-post turn out to have been mistaken also needs reexaminati on both
to check rooral hazard and on equity grounds; at present the burden is
disproporti onately borne by borrowers, with private banks often doing
quite well in reschedulin gs.

In spite of troubles in fonnal South-South integration sch~s,
intra-LDC trade grew vigorously during the 1970s. Such a trend could
be encouraged and accelerated during the 1980s by bolder cooperation
aroong LDC central banks.

ftbre generous reciprocal credit lines could

-40particularly inportant for encouraging trade 1n machinery and other
capital goods.

'nus type of relatively m:xlest step 1n financial

cooperation, say arrong the Central Banks or Brazil an1 Mexico. may
be quite useful 1n the environrent of the 1980s and may indeed pave

the way .toward joint ba.rga1n1ng vis-a-vis third parties.

-41*ACKNOWI.EOOEMENrS
'!he following persons provided useful corments during the

preparation of this paper:

F.dinar

Bacha, Sidney Dell, Jonathan F.aton,

Gerald Helleiner, Charles Kindleberger, Cristian Ossa and John
Williamson.

Standard caveats apply. V1rginia casey expertly and

speedily typed the manuscript.

-42References
Bacha., Edmar 1981. "'!he 1.nt>act of the noat on LOCs: Iatin American
experience in the 1970s." In John Williamson., editor., Exchange
Rate Rules: '!he Theory, Perfonnance and Prospects of the
Crawling Peg. I.Dndon: '!he MacMillan Press Ltd.
Bacha., &mar L• .,
Financial
Essays in
Princeton

and Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro 1982. Intemation al ·
Intennediat ion: A long and Tropical View., Princeton
Internation al Finance No. 147., Princeton N.J• .,
University., Internation al Finance Section., May.

Baeza Valdes., Sergio. 1982. "El costo de desvincular la rentabilida d
del riesgo" Econania y Sociedad (Santiago de Chile)., October.pp. 13-17.
Bertrand., Raynx)nd 1981. "The liberalizat ion of capital mvements
an insight." The 'lhree Banks Review., Number 132., ·necember.
Brodsky., David; Gerald Helleiner and Gary San;>son .1981. "The in;)act

of the current exchange rate system on developing countries."
Trade and DeveloPJIEnt: An UNCT1AD Review., No.3., Winter., pp. 31-52.
Brodsky., David A• ., and Gary P. Sanpson 1981. "In;:>lications of the

effective revaluation of reserve asset gold: '!he case for a
Gold Account for development." World Development., Volume 9.,
Number 7.
Colchester., Nicholas 1981. "A doomsayer on
Times, July 7., p.18.

doan

avoidance." '!he Financial

Cooper.,Richard N. and F.rlwin M. Trtmlan 1971. "An analysis of the role of
internation al capital markets 1n providing funds to developing
countries." Weltwirtsch aftliches Archiv, Number 2, June.
Dell, Sidney 1981. On Being Grandm:>therly: The Evolution of IMF Conditiona lity,
Princeton Essays in Internation al Finance No 144, Princeton, N.J.,
Princeton University., Intemation al Finance Section, October.
Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F. 1971. "Sare aspects of the Brazilian experience
with foreign aid." Chapter 20 1n Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al, eds.
Trade, Balance of Payrents and Growth. Amsterdam:North-Holland Publishing.

!.

-43-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1975. less Develq,ed Countries and the Post-1971
International Financial System, Princeton Essays in International
Finance No. 108, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University,
International Finance Section, April.
"Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s" National
Bureau of Econanic Research Conference Paner No.130,November.

-------- 1981.

D:)mbusch, Rudiger 1982. "Flexible exchange rates and interdependence."
MIT, processed, October.
Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz 1981. Poor Country Borrowing in Private
Financial Markets and the Repudiation Issue. Princeton Studies in
International Finance No. 47. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University
International Finance Section, June.
Foxley, Alejandro 1982. "Towards a free market econaey: Chile 1974-1979."
Journal of Developm.,nt Econanics 10: 3-29.
Frieden, Jeff 1981. "International finance and the nation state in advanced
capitalist and LOCs." Columbia University, processed, September.
Fritsch, Winston "1924" 1979. ANPEC VII Ehcontro Nacional de Econornia
Volure 2, Atibara, Sao Paulo, December pp. 673-732.
Gurley, John G., Hugh T. Patrick and E.S. Shaw 1965. The Financial Structure
of Korea. Reprinted by Research Departmant, The Bank of Korea.
Helleiner, Gerald K. 1982. ''The IMF and Africa in the 1980s."
University of 'Ibronto, processed. November.
Hirschman, Alberto. and Richard M. Bird 1968. Foreign Aid. A Critique
and a Proposal, Princeton Essays in International Finance No. 69,
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University, International Finance
Section. July.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. The World in Depression, 1929-1939.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1978. Manias, Panics and Crashes; A History
of Financial Crisis, New York, Basic Books.

•

-44McKinnon, Ronald I. 1982. "'Ihe order of econanic liberalization: Lessons
fran Chile and Argentina." In K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, eds.,
Economic Policy in a World of Change, vol'LIDe 17.
Cl'llin, Goran 1976. "Debts, developnent and default," in Gerald K. Helleiner,
_editor, A World Divided: 'Ille Less Developed Countries in the
International Econagy. Cambridge: GanDridge Un1versity Press. .
Ruggie, John R. 1982 "International regines, transactions, and change:
embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order." International
Organization 36, 2, Spring, pp. 379-415.
Sachs, Jeffrey 1981 "The current account anq. macroeconomic adjustment in
the 1970s." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Nunt>er 1.
Sachs, Jeffrey and Daniel Cohen 1982. "LOC borrowing with default risk",
National Bureau of Econanic Research Working Paper No. 925.
Solow, Robert M. 1981. "On the lender of last resort." In Charles
P. Kindleberger and Jean-Pierre La.ffargue, eds., Financial
Crises: 'lheory 1 History and Policy. Cambridge: Csmbridge
University Press, pp. 237-248.
Tobin, James 1978 "A proposal for international ioonetary refonn."
Eastern Econanic Journal 4, Nos. 3-4 (July.;.()ctober).
Tr1ff1n, Robert 1964. 'Ihe Evolution of the International Monetary System:

Historical Reappraisal and Future Perspectives. Princeton Studies
in International Finance Section, Princeton University
Tumovsky, Stephen J. 1982. "A determination of the optimal currency
basket: A macroeconanic analysis." Journal of International Economics
12: 333-354

. .,,,._·;.: ..

Wallich, Henry c. 1943."'Ihe future of Latin American dollar balds.
The American Econanic Review 33: 321-335.

------ 1982.

"Notes on the banking scene." Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, processed. October.

Williamson, John 1981a"A survey of the literature on the opt:1mal peg."
Journal of Development F.conomics 11: 39-61.
_______ 1982b The lending Policies of the International Monetary
Fund. Policy Analyses 1n international economics No. 1. Washington,
D.C., Institute for International F.conand.cs, August.

